

# CRISPR Technology and Eco-Restoration

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
10/7/2015



# Outline

- What is CRISPR
- Current environmental engineering projects involving CRISPR
- CRISPR and AIS


# The CRISPR System







# Using CRISPR/Cas9 to edit genes




Prashant Mali




Mali P\*, Yang L\*, **Esvelt KM**, Aach J, Guell M, DiCarlo JE, Norville JE, Church GM (2013) *Science*  
Cong L, Ran FA, Cox D, Lin S, Barretto R, Habib N, Hsu PD, Wu X, Jiang W, Marraffini L, Zhang F (2013) *Science*  
Jinek M, East A, Cheng A, Lin S, Ma E, Doudna J (2013) *eLife*

# Using CRISPR/Cas9 to edit genes



# Orthogonal CRISPR Proteins Permit Concurrent Editing, Activation, and Repression



Esvelt KM\*, Mali P\*, Braff J, Moosburner M, Yaung SJ, (2013) *Nature Methods*

Bernd Zetsche, Jonathan S. Gootenberg, Omar O. Abudayyeh, ..., Aviv Regev, Eugene V. Koonin, Feng Zhang, (2015) *Cell*



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


# The malaria epidemic


- *Plasmodium*, a parasitic single-celled organism
- Carried by mosquitoes, infects humans and other animals
- Affects liver and blood cells
- 2010: >200 Million cases worldwide with >655,000 deaths (90% in Africa)
- State of the art drug: Artemisinin



# Case Study: Malaria



- *Anopheles* Mosquitos are its primary host
- Engineered SMI peptide in the mosquito gut appear to halt Malaria development
- If we can replace wild-type mosquitos with GM ones, we can eradicate Malaria




Austin Burt first proposed to harness natural endonuclease gene drives to alter wild populations in 2003

Problem #1: Retargeting natural homing endonuclease enzymes is very difficult

Problem #2: Even if you could, the resulting gene drive would not be evolutionarily stable


# Gene-Drives for Malaria Eradication





Andie Smidler












Altering an organism almost always reduces its ability to survive and reproduce in the wild

*"Natural Selection... is a power incessantly ready for action, and is as immeasurably superior to Man's feeble efforts as the works of Nature are to those of Art."*  
- Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species

Is there a general way to evade natural selection?








Genome



Cas9  
+  
Altered Gene  
+  
Guide RNA











Genome





Cas9  
+  
Altered Gene  
+  
Guide RNA












**Cas9 + guide RNAs “drive” the altered gene through the population**

**Natural gene drives are present in the genomes of just about all organisms**

- many employ this exact DNA-cutting mechanism (e.g. Homing Nucleases)

# Caveats

- 1) Bacteria, viruses, and other asexual organisms can't be affected
- 2) Fast-reproducing organisms only (Great for most invasives!)



Releasing 1 drive organism per 10,000 wild-type = 16 generations minimum

- 3) The difficulty of building gene drives will vary between species

# Outline

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# Can Gene Drives Work on Invasive Species?



*Rhinella marina*  
(Australia)




*Rattus norvegicus*  
(Galapagos)






*Aedes aegypti*  
(Hawaii)



# Gender-biasing Gene-Drive for *A/S*





Z / W Female





W / W Male



Burt, 2003; Schliekelman et al., 2005; Huang et al., 2007; Deredec et al., 2008; Marshall, 2009; Yahara et al., 2009; Deredec et al., 2011; Alphey and Bonsall, 2014

**Esvelt KM**, Smidler AL, Catteruccia F, Church GM (2014) *eLife*






## Activated by Meiosis I



Burt, 2003; Schliekelman et al., 2005; Huang et al., 2007; Deredec et al., 2008; Marshall, 2009; Yahara et al., 2009; Deredec et al., 2011; Alphey and Bonsall, 2014

**Esvelt KM**, Smidler AL, Catteruccia F, Church GM (2014) *eLife*



# All CRISPR editing is only activated during male meiosis

Burt, 2003; Schliekelman et al., 2005; Huang et al., 2007; Deredec et al., 2008; Marshall, 2009; Yahara et al., 2009; Deredec et al., 2011; Alphey and Bonsall, 2014


**Esvelt KM**, Smidler AL, Catteruccia F, Church GM (2014) *eLife*



# Safety & Containment

- Whether a standard gene drive will spread through a target population depends on molecular factors such as homing efficiency, fitness cost, and evolutionary stability (Marshall&Hay *J. Theoretical Biology* 2012)
- Immunity is expected due to genetic diversity. Immunization can also be “engineered” by releasing organisms with mutations the guide-RNA target
- CRISPR/Cas9 have demonstrated remarkable specificity to the extent that several companies are already investing \$100M+ into human therapeutic applications
- Reversal Drives can be designed using similar principles, and should spread faster than the effector Gene Drive due to it having minimal fitness impact
- Longterm / multigenerational (50+ generations) effects and possibility for species cross-over are currently being investigated in nematode models (*Caenorhabditis*). I expect results within 1 year

# Cost: (cheaper every day)




Source: National Library of Medicine

MIT Technology Review

# Public Image



Drug Production



Infectious Diseases



Nutrition Supplement



Pest Control?

## CRISPR Gene Drives

Improving our understanding




Candidate applications



Wide-spread implementation





Kevin Esvelt

# Acknowledgments



George Church

## Gene Drive Safeguards and Regulation

Kenneth Oye	Shlomiya Lightfoot
James P. Collins	Simon Bullock
Todd Kuiken	Kevin Cook
Andrea Smidler	Fillip Port

## CRISPR/Cas9 for Genome Editing and Regulation

<b>Prashant Mali</b>	John Calarco
Stephanie Yaung	Ari Friedland
Jonathan Braff	Monica Colaiacovo
John Aach	

## Gene Drive Experiments in Mosquitoes

**Andrea Smidler**  
Flaminia Catteruccia

## Gene Drive Experiments in Yeast

**James DiCarlo**  
**Alejandro Chavez**  
Sven Dietz

## Gene Drive Modeling

**Charleston Noble** Fred Gould  
Martin Nowak





# Developing Collective Technologies


Safeguard

Transparenc

Community

Responsivene










# Safeguards for Self-Propagating Biologics


Gene drives must *never* accidentally escape the laboratory!

Confinement measures must be *proof against human error*

Separate *cas9* from guide RNAs




Target a synthetic site



Build gene drives in regions where the organisms can't survive



# Testing RNA-Guided Gene Drive and Confinement in Yeast



← Diverse yeast strains from around the world →

Efficiency of copying is **>99.5%** for all drives over successive generations

That is *at least as good* as natural homing endonuclease gene drives (e.g. I-SceI)


James DiCarlo Alex Chavez Sven Dietz



DiCarlo J\*, Chavez A\*, Dietz S, **Esvelt KM<sup>o</sup>**, Church GM<sup>o</sup> (2015) *bioRxiv* preprint, *in revision*



# RNA-Guided Gene Drive in Fruit Flies (Bier lab)



Efficiency of copying: 97%

**These results strongly suggest that Cas9 can drive most alterations through wild populations both reliably and reversibly**

## Gene Drives

Improving our understanding



Candidate applications



Wide-spread implementation

# Model Organisms

Safely study gene drives in large populations over many generations



*Caenorhabditis*

- fitness
- stability
- evolvability
- spread into related species

Develop drive architectures:

*immunizing reversal*

Undo button: overwrites earlier change

*genetic load / sex biasing*

Suppress or eliminate target population

*sensitizing*

Make populations vulnerable to an otherwise harmless small molecule -> now a “pesticide”

*constrained*

Control extent of gene drive spread

# Candidate Applications in Target Organisms



*Anopheles* mosquitoes  
(malaria)



*Aedes* mosquitoes  
(dengue, chikungunya)



Ticks  
(Lyme disease)



Pigweed  
(herbicide resistance)



Desert locust  
(crop devastation)



Asian carp  
(invasive pest)



Black rat  
(invasive pest)



Cane toad  
(invasive pest)

**Esvelt KM**, Smidler AL, Catteruccia F, Church GM (2014) *eLife*

Oye K\*, **Esvelt KM\***, Appleton E, Catteruccia F, Church GM, Kuiken T, Lightfoot S, McNamara J, Smidler A, Collins JP. (2014) *Science*



# Developing Collective Technologies

Safeguard

Transparenc

Community

Responsivene





# Goats in the Galapagos



- We have introduced rats, pigs, and even goats to the Galapagos
- The goats were destroying local habitats and wild life on the Galapagos

# What we did about it



- Goat population peaked at ~80,000
- The problem was solved in 2006 by ex-military exterminators
- There are still rats on the Galapagos

# Mosquitos around the world

- We brought mosquitos to Hawaii
- Associated diseases have driven over 1/3 of of Hawaiian honeycreeper to extinction






# We tried to fix the mosquito problem

- “Sterile insect release” technique, pioneered by Bushland and Knipling in 1950s
- Limited successes, require repeated large-scale release on islands







## Endonuclease gene drives will sometimes create “drive-resistant” mutations




**How can we build evolutionarily stable gene drives?**



Fitness landscape of the target gene without the drive




Fitness landscape of the target gene with the drive




Fitness landscape of the target gene with the drive






We can build evolutionarily stable gene drives by targeting  
*multiple sites...*  
... within genes that are *important for fitness*



We can build evolutionarily stable gene drives by targeting  
*multiple sites...*  
... within genes that are *important for fitness*

# Modeling Multiplex Cutting and Gene Drive Spread



Charleston Noble



Targeting multiple sites could also enable gene drive even in species with low copying rates


Noble C, Esvelt KM, Nowak MA, Church GM, *in preparation*

# Title and Content Layout with List

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- Add your second bullet point here
- Add your third bullet point here



# Title and Content Layout with Chart



# Two Content Layout with Table

- First bullet point here
- Second bullet point here
- Third bullet point here

	Group A	Group B
Class 1	82	95
Class 2	76	88
Class 3	84	90

# Two Content Layout with Table

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- Second bullet point here
- Third bullet point here

